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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RICHARD MCDONALD, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 02:09 -  cv -  00442
)
PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE; )
COLONEL FRANK PAWLOWSKI, )
Commissioner of Pennsylvania State Police )
in his official capacity; MAJOR JOHN )
GALLAHER, in his individual capacity, )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
Presently before the Court on remand is DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT (Doc. No. 46). The Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order of April 1, 2011, 
which granted the motion, was affirmed in part and vacated in part by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit in a non-precedential opinion dated June 22, 2012. Subsequently, 
the remaining issues have been additionally briefed by counsel (Document Nos. 69 and 70). 
Further, the United States has filed a Notice of Intervention with an attached memorandum of 
law. The summary judgment motion is now ripe for disposition.
Factual and Procedural Background
The factual background was set forth in the Court’s previous Memorandum Opinion, to 
which neither party has objected. For convenience, it is repeated herein.
Defendant Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) is an agency of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania. The PSP, among other things, administers the Municipal Police Officers 
Education and Training Commission (“MPOETC”), a twenty member commission charged with
the responsibility to establish and administer training and certification of police officers. 53 
Pa.C.S.A. § 2164. In order to serve as a police officer in a Pennsylvania municipal police 
department, the officer must be certified by MPOETC pursuant to Pennsylvania Municipal 
Police Education and Training Act (“Act 120”), 53 Pa.C.S.A. § 2161 et seq. Defendant 
Pawlowski was the Commissioner of the PSP and served as the Chairman of MPOETC by virtue 
of that position. 53 Pa.C.S.A. § 2163. Defendant Gallaher served as the Executive Director of 
MPOETC and administered the program on a daily basis with a staff of fifteen people.
MPOETC administrative officer Beverly Young, certification unit supervisor Judy Herr and 
application processor Erica Aikens were directly involved in processing applications for 
certification.
Plaintiff has, throughout his career, been employed in various law enforcement capacities 
in Pennsylvania. Between 1989 and 2002, Plaintiff was employed by the City of Pittsburgh 
Bureau of Police as a uniformed officer, a member of the drug task force and as a detective in the 
homicide unit. As a Pittsburgh Police officer, Plaintiff was certified by MPOETC as having 
fulfilled the necessary education and training requirements to serve in that capacity. Following 
his tenure as a Pittsburgh Police officer, Plaintiff was employed by the Pennsylvania Office of 
Attorney General as a “Special Agent II” from 2002 to 2006. Act 120 certification was not 
required for Plaintiff’s employment with the state Attorney General and his certification lapsed.
In December 2002, McDonald suffered a work-related automobile accident, in which he 
sustained a herniated disc at L5-S1. He continued to perform his duties as a special agent for 
approximately one year after the accident. Due to chronic pain, McDonald had lumbar 
decompression and fusion surgery in November 2003. After the surgery, McDonald attempted
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to resume his duties as a special agent, but was unable to do so, and his employment was 
eventually terminated.1 In July 2006, McDonald had additional surgery to remove the pedicle 
screw and other hardware that had been implanted in the original surgery. McDonald received 
additional therapy, a continuing course of pain management therapy, and his condition began to 
improve.
As a direct result of his injuries, Plaintiff was lawfully prescribed the narcotic pain 
reliever Avinza at a stable dosage of 60 mg per day. McDonald testified that, with Avinza, he 
has no physical limitations that would impede him from performing the duties of a police officer. 
He can bend, handcuff a suspect who is lying on the ground, lift and/or subdue a person. 
McDonald is limited only as to the ability to sit in a car for hours on end or to stand in one place 
for an extended period of time. As McDonald explained, the Avinza helps to minimize the pain 
from his nerve damage so that he is able to perform his life activities.
In May 2007, the Borough of Ellwood City, Pennsylvania (the “Borough”) offered 
Plaintiff the position of Police Chief. In order to serve in that capacity, McDonald was required 
to be re-certified by MPOETC. On August 20, 2007, Plaintiff and the Borough entered into an 
employment agreement and Plaintiff commenced work as the Chief of Police. In June/July 2007 
and again in April 2008, the Borough of Ellwood City requested that MPOETC re-certify 
Plaintiff as a police officer.
The MPOETC application included a Physical Examination report completed by Dr. 
Andrew Margolis on May 25, 2007, which stated that McDonald was physically fit to be 
certified as a police officer. The MPOETC application also contained a June 5, 2007
1 McDonald filed suit, alleging that he had not received appropriate accommodation of his back 
injury.
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Psychological Report from Julie Uran, Ph.D., who opined that there was “no indication that 
would preclude [McDonald] from execution of duties as a police officer to include weapon 
usage.” The Report noted McDonald’s car accident and resultant back pain, but did not 
specifically address his use of Avinza.
On July 16, 2007, MPOETC notified the Borough that McDonald had passed the 
Certification Exam and, upon receipt of a completed application with required documentation, he 
would be recommended for certification as a police officer as a “waiver of training” applicant.
On October 12, 2007, MPOETC notified the Borough that the Commission had denied 
certification of McDonald. The letter explained that based on the documents reviewed by the 
medical advisor to the Commission, McDonald did not have the physical capacity to perform the 
essential job tasks of a police officer without medical restriction. The “medical advisor” was 
Darby Hand, D.O., FACP, a PSP medical officer. In a two-page email on October 2, 2007 to 
Judy Herr, Dr. Hand explained his rationale for concluding that McDonald was physically 
incapable of performing the duties of a police officer. In essence, Dr. Hand credited the 
consensus of three pre-2006 neurosurgeon independent medical examiners (“IMEs”) that 
McDonald had reached Maximum Medical Improvement (“MMI”) and was limited to light or 
medium-light duty as a result of the injuries from his car accident. Dr. Hand found it “difficult to 
believe” the contrary opinion expressed by Dr. Margolis in his May 2007 Physical Examination 
report. Dr. Hand did not specifically reference McDonald’s use of Avinza.
In response to the denial of certification, McDonald sent a letter to MPOETC on October 
22, 2007 in which he sought reconsideration of its decision, offered to provide updated medical 
records and/or undergo an IME at his own cost, and inquired into his right to a hearing. On
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November 26, 2007, an attorney from the Office of Chief Counsel to the PSP notified McDonald 
that he had no right to a hearing.
On January 9, 2008, as a result of MPOETC’s refusal to provide certification under Act 
120, the Borough demoted McDonald to the position of Chief of Operations, a position with 
lower pay and benefits. The Borough suggested this arrangement because it wanted McDonald 
to remain on the job. The parties re-negotiated a two-year contract under which McDonald 
performed very similar day-to-day activities at the police department.
On March 12, 2008, Charles H. Ziegler, D.O., performed a Functional Performance 
Evaluation at the request of the Borough and opined that McDonald was capable of performing 
the essential demands of the Police Chief job. Dr. Ziegler noted the prior surgeries and some 
residual radiculopathy in the left leg, but concluded that McDonald had “no functional 
limitations.” Dr. Ziegler did not address the use of Avinza. McDonald forwarded the IME to 
Beverly Young at MPOETC on April 12, 2008. On April 17, 2008, Dr. Uran performed another 
Psychological Examination and prepared a Report in which she opined that McDonald was 
psychologically capable of exercising appropriate judgment and restraint to be certified as a 
police officer. Dr. Uran further stated: “There is no indication that would preclude him from 
execution of duties as a police officer or engaging in lethal weapon usage.” She averred that her 
report was submitted “with the highest degree of psychological certainty.”
On June 9, 2008, Dr. Hand sent another memorandum to Judy Herr which addressed Dr. 
Ziegler’s medical opinion and explained the basis for Dr. Hand’s continued belief that McDonald 
was not fit to serve as a police officer. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 23.) For the purpose of summary 
judgment, the Court will assume that Dr. Hand misinterpreted Dr. Ziegler’s evaluation of
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McDonald’s physical capabilities. In addition, Dr. Hand continued to emphasize the lack of
documentation to explain how McDonald’s condition could have substantially improved since
2006, when three IME’s had opined that he was disabled.
On July 8, 2008, MPOETC selected Dr. John Levy to perform another IME to evaluate
McDonald’s physical capabilities. On August 13, 2008, after reviewing medical records and
performing a physical examination, Dr. Levy opined that McDonald was “capable of tolerating a
full duty position as police chief as well as performing the essential tasks of a police officer.”
(Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5.) Dr. Levy then stated:
My only concern is the patient does take oral narcotics on a daily basis. However,
I will state that by report he has not taken increasing doses. He has taken a stable 
amount for the past year. In my opinion, I believe that he would be capable of 
performing his duties, taking narcotics on a daily basis, as long as this is 
supervised by a specialized pain management physician, such as Dr. Weidner, 
who currently takes care of Mr. McDonald. I am unaware of the police policy 
referable to the use of prescribed narcotics in the workplace. If in fact they are 
allowed, I believe that Mr. McDonald is capable of reentering the workplace as a 
police officer full time, full duty without restrictions. If there is any concern in 
terms of his mental abilities referable to the use of narcotics, certainly cognitive 
testing through psychological testing could be considered. Based on his 
presentation today, my opinion is that Mr. McDonald is fit for duty as the police 
chief of Ellwood City Police Department and capable of performing all the 
essential tasks of a police officer.
On September 2, 2008, Dr. Hand sent another memorandum to Beverly Young at 
MPOETC, which expressed his analysis of Dr. Levy’s IME.2 (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4.) Dr. Hand 
acknowledged that Dr. Levy opined that McDonald was fit for duty, but for the first time, 
focused on the use of Avinza. Dr. Hand recognized that McDonald was under the care of a pain
2
Defendant Gallaher is copied on Young’s request to Dr. Hand for an updated opinion, but is not 
copied on any of Dr. Hand’s responses. The record reflects that Gallaher had only a tangential, 
supervisory role in the processing of McDonald’s application.
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control physician and that there was no evidence that he was abusing Avinza. On the other hand,
Dr. Hand was concerned that Avinza was a long acting oral form of morphine with numerous
reported potential side effects. Dr. Hand stated that if a member of the PSP “were to take this
drug for a legitimate reason they would be excluded from any critical duty and placed on
medically limited duty until such time as they no longer used this drug.” Dr. Hand believed that
chronic use of Avinza could result in a cognitive deficit and he was “not able to say that Mr.
McDonald would be able to function in the capacity of a certified municipal police officer who is
engaged in the day to day tasks of law enforcement in which coherent, quick and precise
decision making is paramount.” In summary, Dr. Hand opined:
I am mightily resistant (emphasis in original) to the assertion, or belief, that they 
would be able to respond appropriately in situations that require split second 
thinking and instantaneous action to protect themselves and the public. I believe 
it to be imprudent to allow Mr. McDonald to be certified as a municipal police 
officer while using this medication.
Dr. Hand did not know whether McDonald actually suffered from any of the potential side 
effects of Avinza and he acknowledged that no physical or mental side effects had been reported. 
Nevertheless, as set forth in a letter dated October 14, 2008, MPOETC continued to withhold Act 
120 certification “because of his daily use of Avinza, a prescription narcotic, and its potential 
side effects . . . .” Counsel for McDonald made another request for a hearing on October 28, 
2008. On October 30, 2008, Lisa A. Weidner, M.D., opined that McDonald had been stable on 
his present medications, had demonstrated no side effects from the Avinza and was 
“neurologically intact and functioning fully cognitively.” Dr. Weidner had no concerns that 
McDonald would have any limitations due to his chronic pain or the medications prescribed for
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treating that pain. On November 14, 2008, MPOETC again advised counsel that McDonald was 
not entitled to a hearing.
McDonald’s contract as Chief of Operations with the Borough expired on December 31, 
2008. Pursuant to a settlement agreement, McDonald remained on a “leave of absence” for the 
entire 2009 calendar year. McDonald is now employed doing investigative services for the 
Travelers Group.
The Complaint in this case was filed by Plaintiff on April 15, 2009 and asserted the 
following claims: (1) a violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by the Pennsylvania State 
Police (“PSP”); (2) a violation of Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by 
Defendant Pawlowski in his official capacity as Commissioner of the PSP, for which McDonald 
seeks declaratory and injunctive relief; and (3) a Due Process violation by Defendant Gallaher in 
his individual capacity. Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief; compensatory damages at Count 1; 
injunctive relief at Count 2 in the form of an Order that Defendants certify Plaintiff as a police 
officer; and attorneys fees and costs.
Defendants seek summary judgment on all counts. In its April 1, 2011 Memorandum 
Opinion, the Court granted summary judgment on the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims based 
on Lekich v. Pawlowski, 361 Fed. Appx. 322 (3d Cir. January 15, 2010) (non-precedential), in 
which the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had recently rejected very similar 
ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims and held that MPOETC is not a “covered entity.” The 
Court also granted summary judgment on McDonald’s due process claim against Gallaher. On 
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that this Court erred in
McDonald had filed an EEOC charge against the mayor of Ellwood City.
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disposing of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims on the basis of the holding in Lekich that 
Defendants were not “covered entities” 4 and pointed out that McDonald’s claim was based on 
Title II of the ADA, which prohibits discrimination by “public entities.” The case was remanded 
for this Court to address Defendants’ other defenses to the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. 
The Court of Appeals further instructed that it would be inappropriate for this Court to decide 
whether the abrogation of sovereign immunity in Title II of the ADA was constitutional “unless 
and until it is decided that McDonald has made out a distinct Title II claim.” Opinion at 6 n.1. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed this Court’s decision as to the due process claim.
Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs summary judgment. In interpreting Rule 56,
the United States Supreme Court has stated:
The plain language . . . mandates entry of summary judgment, after adequate time 
for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and 
on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there 
can be “no genuine issue as to material fact,” since a complete failure of proof 
concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily 
renders all other facts immaterial.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U S. 317, 322-323 (1986).
An issue of material fact is genuine only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). The court must view the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, and
the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists rests with the movant.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The "existence of disputed issues of material fact should be
4 The term “covered entity” applies to claims brought under Title I of the ADA.
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ascertained by resolving all inferences, doubts and issues of credibility against the moving 
party.” Ely v. Hall's Motor Transit Co., 590 F.2d 62, 66 (3d Cir. 1978) (quoting Smith v. 
Pittsburgh Gage & Supply Co., 464 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1972)). Final credibility 
determinations on material issues cannot be made in the context of a motion for summary 
judgment, nor can the district court weigh the evidence. Josey v. John R  Hollingsworth Corp., 
996 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1993); Petruzzi’sIGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 
F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1993).
When the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party's 
burden can be “discharged by ‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the District Court—that there is 
an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. If the 
moving party has fulfilled this responsibility, the burden shifts to the non-moving party, who 
cannot rest on the allegations of the pleadings and must “do more than simply show that there is 
some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Petruzzi'sIGA Supermarkets, 998 F.2d at 1230. When the 
non-moving party's evidence in opposition to a properly supported motion for summary 
judgment is “merely colorable” or “not significantly probative,” the court may grant summary 
judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-250.
Legal Analysis
MPOETC has the responsibility under Pennsylvania law to certify whether or not a 
candidate has the physical and mental ability to serve as a municipal police officer. MPOETC 
concluded that McDonald should not receive such certification due to his long-term consumption
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of the medically prescribed narcotic drug Avinza. Plaintiff points to evidence from numerous 
medical professionals who have opined that he is physically and mentally capable of performing 
the duties and responsibilities of a police chief and suffers no side effects from Avinza. 
Nevertheless, MPOETC has adhered to a rigid position that consumption of Avinza prevents 
McDonald from being certified. In essence, Plaintiff is asking the Court (or a jury) to override 
MPOETC’s certification decision.
ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims
Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, provides that “no qualified individual with a 
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the 
benefits of the services, programs or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to 
discrimination by any such entity.” The Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), provides: “No 
otherwise qualified individual with a disability ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, 
be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance....” In the case of Inmates of 
Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, 93 F.3d 1124, 1136 (3d Cir. 1996)5, the Court of Appeals 
explained that the substantive legal standards governing claims under the Rehabilitation Act and 
Title II of the ADA are identical:
Although the language of the two statutes differs slightly-e.g., the Rehabilitation 
Act protects against discrimination “solely by reason of ... disability,” whereas the 
ADA protects against discrimination “by reason of ... disability”-the standards
5 This opinion was vacated after the Court granted rehearing en banc, 93 F.3d 1146. However, 
the opinion was subsequently cited by the Court of Appeals in Haybarger v. Lawrence County 
Adult Probation and Parole, 551 F.3d 193, 200 (3d Cir. 2008), and provides a succinct summary 
of the applicable law.
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under the two statutes are identical. McDonald v. Pennsylvania Department o f 
Public Welfare, 62 F.3d 92, 94 (3d Cir. 1995) ( “Whether suit is filed under the 
Rehabilitation Act or under the Disabilities Act, the substantive standards for 
determining liability are the same.”). We have held that there are four elements 
for establishing a violation of section 504: (1) that the plaintiff is an “individual 
with a disability” as defined under the Act, (2) that the plaintiff is “otherwise 
qualified” for the program sought or that the plaintiff would be qualified if the 
defendant made reasonable modifications to the program, (3) that the plaintiff was 
excluded from the program “solely by reason of her or his disability,” and (4) that 
the program receives federal funds. Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Center, 49 
F.3d 1002, 1009 (3d Cir. 1995). With the exception of the fourth element, which 
is not pertinent to a claim brought under the ADA, the elements of a claim under 
Title II of the ADA are interchangeable with the elements of a claim under section 
504. Thus, an ADA Title II claimant must show (1) that the plaintiff is “qualified” 
or that the plaintiff would be qualified if the defendant made reasonable 
modifications, (2) that the plaintiff has a “disability,” and (3) that “by reason of 
such disability,” the plaintiff was excluded from a service, program, or activity 
provided by a public entity.
Accord Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 475 F.3d 524, 553 n.32 (3d Cir.
2007). In essence, Title II of the ADA applies the Rehabilitation Act standard to all public
entities, regardless of whether they receive federal funds. Id.
Contentions of the Parties
McDonald alleges that Defendants regarded him as physically and/or cognitively disabled 
due to his back injury and use of Avinza. Plaintiff also contends that his ADA claim for 
prospective relief is not barred pursuant to the Ex Parte Young doctrine and that Congress has 
abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity in the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12202. Plaintiff further 
argues that it is irrelevant that MPOETC does not directly receive federal funds because it is not 
a separate agency, but rather, is part of the PSP, which does receive federal funds. Finally, 
Plaintiff contends that there are a multitude of factual disputes as to whether he is a qualified
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person with a physical or cognitive disability; whether Defendants regarded him as substantially 
limited in his ability to work; and whether he was excluded from a broad class of jobs. In his 
post-remand supplemental brief, Plaintiff additionally contends that Title II validly abrogated 
sovereign immunity of the states and that Defendants regarded him as substantially limited in the 
major life activity of working.
Defendants contend that the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims are barred by sovereign 
immunity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. Defendants 
also contend that the Rehabilitation Act claim must fail because MPOETC, allegedly the real 
party in interest, receives no federal funding. Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot 
show that he has an actual disability; that he is otherwise qualified for the position of police 
officer; or that he is significantly restricted from performing a broad range of jobs. In their post­
remand brief, Defendants reiterate these contentions and emphasize that they are entitled to 
immunity and that McDonald is not “disabled.”
Lekich v. Pawlowski
As noted above, this Court’s April 1, 2011 Memorandum Opinion relied heavily on 
Lekich, 361 Fed. Appx. at 322, which arose from a very similar fact situation. Lekich was a 
police officer candidate who had completed the police training program and received an offer of 
employment from a borough police department, contingent upon MPOETC certification. The 
examining physician determined that Lekich was color-blind, in contravention of MPOETC 
certification requirements. The employment offer from the borough was then rescinded. Lekich 
secured another doctor’s opinion that the color perception problem would not interfere with his
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ability to perform the job of a police officer and sought to have MPOETC either waive the vision 
requirement or consider the new medical opinion. MPOETC refused because the application 
packet had been withdrawn by the borough. As in this case, the conduct at issue occurred prior 
to January 1, 2009, the effective date of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”).6 
Lekich filed claims under the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, Section 1983 and the Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Act against Pawlowski, in his official capacity as Chairman of MPOETC. The 
district court granted summary judgment to Defendant on all claims and the Court of Appeals 
affirmed.
As in this case, MPOETC was acting as a public certification agency, rather than as a 
direct employer. The Lekich Court held that “MPOETC did not violate the non-discrimination in 
employment provisions of the ADA because it is not subject to them.” Id. at 326. The Court 
explained that MPOETC is not a “covered entity” as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2), but “is 
merely a governmental body that certifies that an applicant has or has not met certain 
preordained guidelines when a police department -  an employer -  directs it to process an 
application.” Id. at 325-26. In remanding the instant case, the Court of Appeals held that Lekich 
is not dispositive because it cited Title I of the ADA, while McDonald’s claim is based on Title 
II of the ADA.7
In Lekich, the Court of Appeals also concluded that even assuming, arguendo, MPOETC 
is covered by the ADA, the discrimination claims asserted by Lekich lacked merit. Specifically,
6 In Britting v. Secretary, Dept. Of Veterans Affairs, 409 Fed. Appx. 566, 569 (3d Cir. February 
1, 2011) (non-precedential), the Court of Appeals held that the ADAAA is not retroactive.
7 The Complaint in Lekich did not specifically state whether it was based on Title I and/or Title II 
of the ADA.
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the Court held that MPOETC had not taken an adverse employment action because Lekich’s job 
offer was withdrawn and MPOETC was never in a position to make a final certification decision. 
Id. at 326. The alternative holding in Lekich does not resolve this case because McDonald did 
have an employment offer and MPOETC did deny his certification request. Thus, the Court 
turns to an examination of the merits of McDonald’s claims.
Whether McDonald is “Disabled”
McDonald alleges that he suffers from a disability. It is unclear whether the alleged 
disability is physical (from the underlying back injury suffered in the car accident); cognitive 
(from the alleged side effects of Avinza); or some combination thereof. Defendants contend that 
McDonald does not suffer from a disability.
The Court concludes that there is no genuine factual dispute as to whether McDonald 
suffers from an actual disability. McDonald avers that he is “completely fit to serve as a police 
officer.” Complaint at 1. The evidentiary record in this case supports that averment. Physically, 
McDonald passed a strenuous Functional Performance Evaluation in March 2008, which 
included stair climbing, pushing/pulling a 100-pound sled, and lifting 50 pounds. McDonald 
testified in his deposition that, with Avinza, he has no physical limitations that would prevent
o
him from performing the duties of a police officer. He can bend, handcuff a suspect who is 
lying on the ground, lift a person, and subdue a person. Indeed, McDonald performed the job of 
Chief of Operations for the Elwood City police department while his certification request was
o
Because the ADAAA is not retroactive, the ameliorative effects of medications may be 
considered in evaluating the extent of an individual’s impairments. Sutton v. United Air Lines, 
Inc., 527 U S. 471, 499 (1999).
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pending. McDonald was functionally limited only as to the ability to sit in a car for hours on end
or to stand in one place for an extended period of time. On April 17, 2008, Dr. Uran performed a
Psychological Examination and opined that McDonald was psychologically capable of
exercising appropriate judgment and restraint to be certified as a police officer. After an IME in
August 2008, Dr. Levy opined: “Based on his presentation today, my opinion is that Mr.
McDonald is fit for duty as the police chief of Ellwood City Police Department and capable of
performing all the essential tasks of a police officer.” Based on this record, no reasonable jury
could conclude that McDonald has an actual disability.
In the alternative, McDonald also contends that Defendants “regarded” him as disabled.
Indeed, this is the primary contention set forth in McDonald’s supplemental brief. In Sutton, 527
U.S. at 489 (an ADA Title I case), the Supreme Court explained:
There are two apparent ways in which individuals may fall within this statutory 
definition: (1) a covered entity mistakenly believes that a person has a physical 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2) a 
covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment 
substantially limits one or more major life activities. In both cases, it is necessary 
that a covered entity entertain misperceptions about the individual—it must 
believe either that one has a substantially limiting impairment that one does not 
have or that one has a substantially limiting impairment when, in fact, the 
impairment is not so limiting. These misperceptions often “resul[t] from 
stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of ... individual ability.”
The Sutton Court further explained that “the purpose of the regarded as prong is to cover
individuals rejected from a job because of the ‘myths, fears and stereotypes' associated with
disabilities.” Id. at 489-90. Accord New Directions Treatment Services v. City o f Reading, 490
F.3d 293, 303-04 (citing SchoolBd. o f Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987))
(“courts should be mindful of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act's goals of eliminating
16
discrimination against individuals with disabilities and protecting those individuals from 
deprivations based on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear.”).
McDonald contends that by denying his certification, he has been disqualified from 
performing a class or broad range of law enforcement jobs that utilize his training, knowledge 
and skills and therefore Defendants regarded him as being substantially limited in the major life 
activity of “working.” The parties vigorously dispute the scope of law enforcement jobs 
available to McDonald without MPOETC certification. Defendants point out that he is presently 
employed as an investigator for an insurance company and worked for several years as “Director 
of Operations” of the Ellwood City police department. Defendants further contend that 
MPOETC certification is not needed for law enforcement positions with the federal government, 
the Office of the Attorney General of Pennsylvania, a private detective, a park ranger, or campus 
police. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 471 (myopic airline pilots not regarded as disabled because they 
could work as regional pilots or instructors). McDonald responds that MPOETC certification, or 
its equivalent, is necessary for many of these positions, and that Defendants apply the same drug 
standards for administering Act 235 lethal weapons certification. See Williams v. Philadelphia 
Housing Authority, 380 F.3d 751, 763 (3d Cir. 2004) (police officer regarded as disabled because 
mental condition disqualified him from broad class of law enforcement jobs). Due to this focus, 
the parties have not comprehensively addressed other facets of the “regarded as” theory.
As the Court of Appeals instructed in remanding this case, decisions citing Title I must be 
treated with caution. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Sutton noted the conceptual difficulties 
inherent in “regarded as” claims based on alleged limitations in the major life activity of 
working. 527 U.S. at 492. Neither party has addressed the difficulties in applying ADA Title I
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“regarded as” cases to the facts and circumstances of this ADA Title II case. Indeed, in Farid v.
Bouey, 554 F. Supp.2d 301, 327 n. 19 (N.D.N.Y. 2008), the Court suggested that the “regarded
as” theory may not even apply to Title II claims:
While the definition of a disabled individual under the ADA includes a person 
regarded as having a physical or mental impairment substantially limiting one or 
more major life activities, that definition section appears to apply only to 
disability discrimination in the employment setting under Title I of the ADA, and 
discrimination based upon a perceived disability is not similarly actionable under 
Title II in a setting such as that now at issue. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); 29 C.F.R. § 
1630.2(a)-(f), ( l ) (indicating that this definition of a perceived disability applies 
to employers and other covered entities under Title I, such as employment 
agencies). The same does not appear to hold true, however, with respect to section 
504. see 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iv)(C).
Conceptually, there is a fundamental distinction between an individualized determination 
by a state certification/licensing board and the stereotypical prejudice by employers that ADA 
Title I was intended to address.9 A certification board, such as MPOETC, is established for the 
very purpose of considering and evaluating whether an applicant can perform the essential 
functions of a job. MPOETC does not consider whether an individual is significantly limited in 
the major life activity of working -  it merely considers whether or not the applicant is entitled to 
the particular certification within its authority. Phrased another way, there is no evidence in this 
record that MPOETC regarded McDonald as “disabled,” as opposed to simply regarding him as 
unfit for certification as a municipal police officer.
9 The parties have not cited any ADA Title II cases involving a professional license or 
certification decision. The Court has found only a few such cases in its own research, each of 
which has held that such claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Reese v. State o f 
Michigan, 234 F.3d 1269 (6th Cir. 2000) (non-precedential) (denial of certification to color-blind 
police officer); Alsbrook v. City o f Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (same); 
Guttman v. Khalsa, 669 F.3d 1101 (10th Cir. 2012) (denial of physician license).
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Another conceptual difficulty with McDonald’s claims is that MPOETC’s denial was not 
based on an inherent physical or cognitive limitation, but on the potential side effects of his 
prescribed medication, Avinza. In Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army Depot, 602 F.3d 177, 185-86 (3d 
Cir. 2010), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recognized that an alleged disability due to 
the side effects of a medication is different than a disability resulting from the underlying health 
problem the medication was meant to treat. The Court explained that in a limited way, such side 
effects may constitute a disability:
For a treatment's side effects to constitute an impairment under the ADA, it is not 
enough to show just that the potentially disabling medication or course of 
treatment was prescribed or recommended by a licensed medical professional. 
Instead, following the Christian test, the medication or course of treatment must 
be required in the “prudent judgment of the medical profession,” and there must 
not be an available alternative that is equally efficacious that lacks similarly 
disabling side effects. Christian, 117 F.3d at 1052. The concept of “disability” 
connotes an involuntary condition, and if one can alter or remove the 
“impairment” through an equally efficacious course of treatment, it should not be 
considered “disabling.”
Id. at 187. In this case, Dr. Hand’s resistance to certification for McDonald was expressly 
limited to the period “while using this medication.” On this record, it appears that McDonald 
could have obtained his certification by switching to a non-narcotic pain reliever or by stopping 
his pain medication altogether. It is the plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that the medication 
causing the side effects is medically necessary. Id. There is no evidence in the record that 
Avinza was the “only efficacious medication.” Id. Cases from other appellate courts have 
rejected similar claims involving the side effects of medications. See Daugherty v. Sajar 
Plastics, Inc., 544 F.3d 696, 706 (6th Cir. 2008) (employer’s belief that back condition and 
current medication levels precluded Plaintiff from using dangerous machinery as required to 
perform maintenance technician job did not establish ADA “regarded as” claim); EEOC v. JB
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Hunt, 321 F.3d 69, 73-78 (2d Cir. 2003) (belief that side effects of medication prevented 
individual from safely driving a commercial truck did not establish ADA “regarded as” claim); 
King v. Mrs. Grissom’s Salads, Inc., 187 F.3d 636 (6th Cir. 1999) (non-precedential) (refusal to 
certify truck driver due to his use of Dexedrine was not the type of blanket exclusion that 
violated ADA).
McDonald clearly did not have an actual disability. Nor does the denial of certification 
by MPOETC fit within the “regarded as” disability theory due to a substantial limitation in the 
major life activity of working. MPOETC merely refused to certify McDonald as a police officer 
due to concern over the side effects of his Avinza medication. McDonald has not demonstrated 
that Avinza was the only efficacious medication. In sum, McDonald has not satisfied this 
element of the prima facie case and therefore Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
Whether McDonald is “Otherwise Qualified”
Assuming, arguendo, that McDonald had an actual or regarded as disability, the Court 
concludes that he was not an “otherwise qualified” individual because he was unable to perform 
the essential functions of a police officer. Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that he is a 
qualified individual. Shiring v. Runyon, 90 F.3d 827, 832 (3d Cir. 1996). There is a two-prong 
test for determining whether someone is a qualified individual under the ADA: (1) whether the 
individual satisfies the prerequisites for the position, by possessing the appropriate educational 
background, employment experience, skills and licenses; and (2) whether the individual can 
perform the essential functions of the position, with or without reasonable accommodation. Gaul 
v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1998). It is certainly clear that McDonald
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meets the first prong of the test, as he possesses impressive education, skills and experience. 
However, MPOETC determined that he could not perform the essential functions of the job.
It is well-established, and undisputed in this case, that the job of a police officer is 
uniquely demanding. As explained by the United States Supreme Court, “police officers are 
often forced to make split second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and 
rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Graham 
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989). Accord Watson v. City o f Miami Beach, 177 F.3d 932, 
935 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[P]olice departments place armed officers in positions where they can do 
tremendous harm if they act irrationally.”).
In Diaz v. City o f Philadelphia, 2012 WL 1657866 *13 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (opining that a
jury should not decide what constitutes “reasonable accommodation” in an ADA claim), a sister
court recently explained that an officer’s mental fitness for duty was a unique situation:
we are satisfied that when dealing with the unique situation of police officers and 
issues related to their mental health it would be ill-advised to second-guess the 
personnel decisions of a police department when it is deciding how it can use a 
police officer who suffers from mental health problems. The police department, 
not a jury, is uniquely qualified to make such sensitive decisions.
In Diaz, the Court reasoned that the ADA does not apply to such decisions:
“Especially in the context of police officers, employers do not violate the ADA 
by ensuring that officers are psychologically fit for duty.” Davis-Durnil v. Vill. o f 
Carpentersville, 128 F.Supp.2d 575, 580 (N.D. Ill. 2001). PPD's concern that its 
officers' mental health issues be resolved before they serve on active duty is 
unquestionably reasonable.
Id. at *11. Diaz also cited cases for the proposition that an evaluation of a police officer’s fitness 
for duty does not violate § 12112(d)(4) of the ADA. Id. at *11 n. 28 (citing Thomas v. Corwin, 
483 F.3d 516, 527 (8th Cir. 2007); Pennsylvania State Troopers Ass'n v. Miller, 621 F.Supp.2d
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246, 256 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (“ensuring members' fitness for duty is a business necessity vital to the
operation” of police departments). The EEOC ADA guidance manual cites an inquiry into a
police officer’s use of medications as an example of a situation that would not violate the ADA:
In limited circumstances, however, certain employers may be able to demonstrate 
that it is job-related and consistent with business necessity to require employees in 
positions affecting public safety to report when they are taking medication that 
may affect their ability to perform essential functions. Under these limited 
circumstances, an employer must be able to demonstrate that an employee's 
inability or impaired ability to perform essential functions will result in a direct 
threat. For example, a police department could require armed officers to 
report when they are taking medications that may affect their ability to use a 
firearm or to perform other essential functions of their job.
EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical
Examinations of Employees Under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-inquiries.html (emphasis added). Thus,
the EEOC has recognized that police departments may consider the side effects of medications in
determining whether an officer can perform the essential functions of the job.
The same concerns are equally applicable in this case. MPOETC is the entity uniquely
qualified to make certification decisions under Pennsylvania law. It has determined that the use
of Avinza prevents McDonald from being able to respond appropriately in situations that require
split second thinking and instantaneous action to protect themselves and the public. See Opinion
of Dr. Hand.
The Court recognizes the significant medical evidence in support of McDonald’s position 
that Avinza does not impair his personal cognitive condition and is empathetic to his plight. The 
Court has located two cases in its own research which involved similar factual situations and 
appear to support Plaintiff’s position. See Stillwell v. Kansas City, Mo., Bd. o f Police Comm'rs,
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872 F. Supp. 682, 686-88 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (blanket exclusion of one-handed applicants from 
licensing as police officers violated ADA Title II); Bombrys v. City o f Toledo, 849 F.Supp. 1210, 
1216-19 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (blanket exclusion of insulin-dependent diabetic police officers 
violated ADA Title I); see also Gaus v. Norfolk Southern RR Co., 2011 WL 4527359 (W.D. Pa. 
2011) (denying summary judgment where railroad electrician was barred from work due to 
blanket medication guidelines). The lesson of these cases is that each decision must be based on 
an individualized assessment. But see King v. Mrs. Grissom’s Salads, Inc., 187 F.3d at 636 
(refusal to certify driver due to side effects of medication is not the type of “blanket exclusion” 
that violates ADA). It is clear that McDonald’s application received lengthy, individualized 
attention which included a substantial number of personal medical evaluations. However, the 
ultimate decision by MPOETC was arguably based on Dr. Hand’s blanket opinion that use of 
Avinza precludes anyone from serving as a police officer, regardless of the lack of side effects.
Nevertheless, the Court is reluctant to usurp MPOETC’s authority to issue certifications. 
A police certification commission should be entitled to evaluate the potential side effects of 
medications in deciding whether a police officer is capable of performing the essential functions 
of this uniquely challenging job without running afoul of the ADA. Absent evidence of the type 
of unreasoning prejudice at which the ADA was aimed, the difficult individualized decisions in 
this unique arena are not well-suited for second-guessing by a Court or jury. In sum, the Court 
concludes that McDonald is not “otherwise qualified.”
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Whether McDonald Was Excluded from a Public Service By Reason of His Disability
As part of his prima facie case, McDonald must prove that he was “excluded” from a 
service, program, or activity provided by a public entity by reason of his alleged disability. It is 
undisputed that MPOETC accepted McDonald’s application and gave full and repeated 
consideration to his situation over a lengthy period of time. Indeed, the Court of Appeals has 
affirmed that McDonald received due process from MPOETC. McDonald does not really 
contend that he was “excluded” from the “services” provided by MPOETC. Instead, he 
disagrees with the substantive result MPOETC reached on his application. This does not satisfy 
the prima facie case requirements.
Whether the PSP is the Proper Defendant
Defendants contend that McDonald has not named the correct parties because the real 
party in interest is MPOETC. In particular, Defendants contend that the Rehabilitation Act claim 
in Count 1 must fail because the MPOETC does not receive federal funding.
As an initial matter, the ADA claim in Count 2 is asserted against Pawlowski in his 
official capacity as Commissioner of the PSP.10 The claim against Pawlowski in his “official 
capacity” is merely an alternative method of pleading an action against the PSP. Lekich, 361 
Fed. Appx. at 325 (citingKoslow v. Commonwealth o f Pa., 302 F.3d 161, 178 (3d Cir. 2002)). 
Thus, in essence, both Counts I and II are claims against the PSP.
10 In Speck v. City o f Philadelphia, 2007 WL 2221423 *9 (E.D. Pa. 2007), the Court explained 
that injunctive relief could not be obtained against state officials in their personal capacities for 
actions taken in their official capacities.
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McDonald maintains that the entity he named as a Defendant, PSP, does receive federal 
funding. Indeed, this fact is undisputed. As Plaintiff is master of his Complaint, he is entitled to 
limit his claims and select the Defendant(s). See Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 469, 474 (3d Cir. 
2006). A defendant is not entitled to re-formulate a plaintiff’s claims. See American Eagle 
Outfitters, Inc. v. Lyle & Scott Ltd., 2007 WL 1202760 *3 n.4 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (allowing 
defendants to reformulate plaintiff’s causes of action would be inconsistent with the rule that 
plaintiff is master of his complaint and with the Court’s obligation to take plaintiff’s allegations 
as true). Accordingly, Defendant’s contention that Count 1 must fail due to lack of federal 
funding must be rejected.
However, the Court must then consider whether McDonald’s asserted injury and 
requested relief is redressable via claims against the PSP. See Pichler v. UNITE, 542 F.3d 380, 
390 (3d Cir. 2008) (“the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the 
defendant, and not the result of some third party not before the court”).11
The Court concludes that the proper Defendant in this action should have been MPOETC. 
MPOETC is subject to suit directly, see, e.g., Lekich, but McDonald consciously decided to not 
name it as a Defendant and has opposed Defendants’ efforts to identify MPOETC as the real 
party in interest in this case. Although MPOETC is included within the PSP budget and is listed 
on the PSP organizational chart, MPOETC is a separate entity. MPOETC is a twenty member
11 Pichler discussed Article III standing. In Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513-515 
(2006), the Supreme Court articulated a distinction between “jurisdictional” flaws which deprive 
the Court of subject-matter jurisdiction and those which render a claim invalid on the merits.
The Court believes, without deciding, that the apparent flaw in this case falls into the latter 
category. McDonald has suffered an injury and has presented claims under federal law and the 
analysis of whether he named the correct party is inextricably linked to the analysis of the merits 
of his claims. Accordingly, the Court has not requested separate briefing on this jurisdictional 
issue.
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commission created by Act 120, 53 P.S. § 2161 et seq., and charged with the responsibility to 
establish and administer training and certification of police officers. 53 P. S. § 2164. Specific 
regulations have been promulgated for MPOETC actions. Of particular relevance, final orders of 
the MPOETC are issued by majority vote. See 37 Pa. Code § 203.103. MPOETC, not the PSP, 
determines the qualifications for certification as a municipal police officer. Indeed, McDonald 
recognized that this task was the responsibility of MPOETC. Complaint ^ 5.
The PSP did not cause McDonald’s claimed injury (i.e., the denial of certification) and 
the PSP cannot provide McDonald with the relief he seeks. In particular, a Court Order directing 
the PSP to certify or re-certify McDonald would be unenforceable. Defendant Pawlowski served 
as the Chairman of MPOETC by virtue of his position as the Commissioner of the PSP. 53 
Pa.C.S.A. § 2163. However, even assuming that Pawlowski is named as a Defendant in his role 
as Chairman of the MPOETC rather than as Commissioner of the PSP, he has only one vote. 
Nothing in the statute or applicable regulations authorize Pawlowski to dictate the outcome of 
MPOETC certification decisions and the other 19 members of MPOETC are not before the 
Court. In sum, even if the Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims were viable against MPOETC, 
the actual Defendants named in this action by McDonald are entitled to summary judgment.
Intervention by United States
The Court of Appeals instructed this Court that it would be inappropriate to decide 
whether the abrogation of sovereign immunity in ADA Title II was constitutional unless it first 
concluded that McDonald had made out a valid claim. For the reasons hereinabove set forth, the
Major Gallaher, Executive Director of MPOETC, was named solely in his individual capacity.
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Court concludes that McDonald has not made out a valid ADA claim. Accordingly, it need not 
decide the constitutional issue.
Conclusion
Mr. McDonald is a litigant with whom the Court empathizes. He has certainly presented 
substantial evidence of his fitness to serve as a police chief and it appears that the denial of his 
certification may have been based on a blanket rule regarding the use of a narcotic drug rather 
than McDonald’s individual circumstances. On the other hand, McDonald is asking the Court 
(or a jury) to substitute its own view of his fitness for duty for that of MPOETC, the Commission 
created by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to perform that role. For the reasons set forth, 
McDonald’s claims do not fit within the contours of the existing law. Accordingly, 
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. No. 46) will be GRANTED. 
An appropriate order follows.
McVerry, J.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RICHARD MCDONALD, 
Plaintiff,
v.
PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE; 
COLONEL FRANK PAWLOWSKI, 
Commissioner of Pennsylvania State Police 
in his official capacity; MAJOR JOHN 
GALLAHER, in his individual capacity,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
) 02:09 -  cv -  00442
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 31st day of October, 2012, in accordance with the foregoing 
Memorandum Opinion, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. No. 46) is GRANTED. 
The clerk is directed to docket this case closed.
BY THE COURT:
s/Terrence F. McVerry 
United States District Court Judge
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